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CONTROL AND COOPTATION IN MEXICAN POLITICS
I. Introduction.
This paper represents an attempt to describe and account for some 
basic features of the Mexican political system. The analysis is struc­
tural rather than historical. That is, we have not tried to narrate how 
the Mexican system came into being, but have rather attempted to set forth 
a somewhat abstract formulation, which we believe can account for certain 
broad tendencies in Mexican politics in the sense that many concrete po­
licies and changes in policies and political events are more or less 
direct manifestations of the principles our formulation contains. The 
formulation consists of (1) a description of what we believe is the basic 
and enduring goal-structure of the Mexican political system, and (2) a set 
of structural principles which seem to determine, broadly speaking, how 
the elements in the goal-structure are implemented, and what the relations 
between different groups in the system will be like. Hence, we believe 
that the basic tendencies of the Mexican polity can be made meaningful 
by our formulation. However, we do not attempt to analyze the question 
why in Mexico there gradually developed a polity having these properties; 
nor do we try to answer the somewhat more fundamental and general question 
about what the conditions are for a political system to develop these pro­
perties. (We do believe that these questions are important, howeverj 
if we knew the answer we would know more about the problem of how to combine 
basic democracy with rapid economic growth, starting from a state of 
rather extreme underdevelopment, than we now know.)
We do not claim to have isolated all the major principles which
determine the structure of Mexican politics. We also regard our present 
formulation as a first tentative statement, although we believe it to 
be essentially correct.
Also our formulation is intended to apply only to modern Mexican 
national politics. Economically and culturally Mexico is a very heteroge­
neous society. In many local areas grassroots politics is structured by 
"traditional factors" like kinship (including ritual kinship or the compadrazRc): 
and sometimes indigenous or Indian political forms of organization have sur­
vived in some modified form. (Sieverts, 1960; Friedrich, 1965.) This is more 
common in some states of the Mexican Union than in others. Politics in some 
southern states, Guerrero is often mentioned as a prime example, is very much 
traditional. In some of the economically more developed states, like Sonora and 
Baja California, politics seem less traditional. There are a host of important 
general questions that could be raised about the way that such traditional 
subsystems operate within the context of the national polity and economy.
One could ask, for instance, how the power position of local bosses (caciques) 
is changed by the welfare and development policies that are carried out by the 
federal government or the regional commissions, modelled on the TVA (for 
instance, the Papaloapan Commission, Coleman 1964). Such a study•of political 
subsystems will not be undertaken in this paper, however.
We will attempt to illustrate our model with descriptions of concrete 
cases drawn from contemporary Mexican politics. The information about 
these comes from accounts in books and newspapers and also from interviews 
we have conducted in Mexico at various times during the period 1963-64.
These cases are only assumed to be illustrative of the mode of analysis 
used in this paper.
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II. The Goal-structure of the Mexican Polity.
An adequate understanding of the structure of a political system 
presupposes an analysis of its goal-structure. Therefore in this section 
we shall attempt to characterize the major goals of the Mexican polity 
and the relations that hold between these goals. The term "goals" refers 
to aims that are consciously being promoted by those in the polity that 
make major decisions. There is, in fact, a great deal of consensus in 
Mexico about what the goals are, and how they relate to one another, 
although groups and individuals differ a great deal with respect to the 
weights and priorities to be given to the different goals. The following 
picture of the goal-structure of Mexican politics has been pieced together 
from official speeches and statements, newspaper editorials and interviews 
with politically active persons.
The following major goals are present in the Mexican polity: politi­
cal stability, economic growth, public welfare and mexicanization. Let 
us now first characterize what we mean by these terms.
Political stability refers to a state where (1) the basic political 
institutions are seen as legitimate by the bulk of the population, (2) the 
incumbent decision-makers are granted the right to make binding decisions, 
even by those who do not always agree with their decisions, (3) the success- 
ion of office-holder^ proceeds according to rules specified in advance, 
that are accepted by most, people as binding. After the overthrow of the 
rigime of Porfirio Diaz in 1911, Mexico went through more than a decade 
of frequent insurrections, civil wars and general fragmentation of the 
political system. Beginning in the twenties, however, the system has
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gradually gained a considerable degree of stability. A rather dramatic 
and much publicized example of change toward stability arose right after 
the 1964 elections, when Gonzales Torres, the unsuccessful candidate of 
the main rightist opposition party, (PAN)*■, publicly acknowledged that the 
candidate of the ruling party, (PRI), had won a clear majority of the po­
pular vote. Prior to this, the PAN typically used to attribute PRI victories 
in elections to large-scale fraud.
Economic growth,in the sense of industrialization and modernization 
of agriculture, was promoted by the Diaz regime and was encouraged by 
the revolutionary regimes in the 1920s, following the economic chaos of 
the civil wars. A very determined effort to make Mexico a modern industrial 
country has been underway since the end of the Second World War. (For 
descriptions of different aspects of the Mexican Economic Modernization 
program see Vernon, 1963, 1964״and Flores, 1961).
Public Welfare. The revolutionary program stressed heavily the need 
for raising the material and cultural level of the Mexican masses. In the 
agrarian sector, a massive land reform program has been carried out in 
order to help the peasants to obtain ownership to their land, and to enable 
landless laborers to acquire some land of their own. (Whetten, 1948; Flores, 
1961). For the urban workers low-cost housing, subsidized staple foods 
and a federally determined minimum wage level (it varies from state to state) 
are among the welfare policies. The middle class, especially that sector 
which consists of government employees, also has available low-cost housing, 
cheap vacation plans and other benefits.
Mexicanization refers to the policy of securing control over the major
^־Partido de Accion Naciona.
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economic companies and activities in the country for either private Mexican 
citizens or public agencies. Before the revolution, and for a substantial 
time after the revolution, foreign companies controlled many aspects of the 
Mexican economy. Since the 1930s the Mexican government has by expropria­
tion or purchase obtained control over many enterprises that used to be 
foreign*owned. The most famous case is, of course, the expropriation of 
the oil companies in 1938, which led to a bitter conflict with the United 
States. (See Cronin, 1960, Chaps. 7-10.) There are also many other less 
well-known cases, like the nationalization of the electric power industry 
(see Vernon, 1964) and land-holdings. (See Cronin, 1960, Chap. 6; Flores, 
1961, Chap. 17.) Nationalism is certainly a driving force behind these 
measures. More important, however, is the belief that if national econo­
mic planning for growth is to be successful (and the Mexican government is 
committed to a policy of rather centralized economic planning), it is 
necessary that Mexican authorities be able to make all major economic 
decisions about investments, allocation of resources and so on. Mexico has 
encouraged foreign capital to invest in Mexico, but demands that the majo­
rity of the shares be under Mexican control.
Let us now turn to the question of how these goals are related to one 
another. For the purpose of this analysis we shall concentrate on short­
term relationships. We are going to use the goal-structure to analyze 
political decision-making, and in Mexico, as in most other systems, poli­
tical and economic planning seems to be conceived over periods of five 
to ten years. A president is elected for six years‘, he cannot constitu­
tionally be reelected, and policies often change somewhat when a new
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administration comes in, so it is often not worth it to plan ahead in detail 
for longer periods than a presidential period.
Our conception of how the major goals of the Mexican polity are related 
to one another (goal-structure) is depicted in the graph shown below. (The 
terra "investment" here refers to investments made into infrastructure and 
industrial enterprise, and does not cover investments into "human capital" 
through welfare policies.)
Figure 1. The goal-structurerof the Mexican Polity.
Arrows represent postulated causal relations.
x — — means the more of x, the more of y.
x ----> y means the more of x, the less of y.
(1) Political stability clearly facilitates investments and other 
means toward economic growth. Stability and order makes economic planning 
feasible, both for private entrepreneurs and public agencies. An unstable 
regime would have difficulty attracting foreign and domestic capital. Loss
of work hours due to political strikes, damage done to equipment, buildings 
and other facilities during disorders would also impede the growth of the 
economy.
(2) Economic growth is clearly a prerequisite for the maintenance and 
extension of welfare services and policies. If a country wishes to indu­
strialize and at the same time undertakes to construct a welfare state, 
then the economic growth rate has to be substantial if both sets of goals 
are to be met. It has been remarked that serious political problems are 
created in countries that attempt to build extensive welfare services before 
they have reached a high enough level of wealth. (Dore, 1964.) Even in 
countries with a certain amount of wealth and a steady growth rate, welfare 
policies may slow down industrialization and economic growth. Wage increases 
and benefits for the workers may mean less capital available for critical 
investments. Land reform measures might sometimes lead to fragmentation of 
land-holdings into economically unviable units.
(3) Following a line of thought that goes back to Durkheim (1933), 
we also assume that industrialization contributes to political stability 
by creating "organic solidaritythat is, interdependence due to division
of labor between the various parts of the country. Localism, the traditional 
individual's sense that he owes his primary allegiance to "La Patria Chica" 
rather than to the nation, may be expected to diminish in importance as a 
result of this. The mobility of the labor force that industrialism tends to 
create, should work in the same direction.
(4) Welfare policies contribute to political stability. In Mexico no 
regime would get much popular support that did not try to improve the lot of
the poor masses, maintain a minimum wage level, give land to at least some 
of the landless, provide cheap housing and subsidized staple foods, and 
organize public works and other welfare facilities.
(5) Mexicanization has, we believe, contributed a great deal to 
political stability in Mexico. Apart from satisfying nationalistic senti­
ments, mexicanization has provided ambitious and competent Mexicans with 
access to important economic command posts, whether as private owners or 
public officials. (To a similar end, Mexico requires foreign companies 
that operate in Mexico to train Mexicans for managerial positions in the 
companies.) The opportunities thus given to aggressive, competent indivi­
duals to acquire power, wealth and prestige within the system, prevents 
them from joining restless strata that might be a threat to the regime. 
(Emerson, 1960; Zelditch and Anderson,1965.)
(6) It also seems clear that the mexicanization program has contributed 
a great deal to economic development in Mexico. Through control over the 
petroleum industry, for instance, the Mexican government has gotten a whole 
industry of synthetic fibers and other chemical products well under way. 
(BermAdez, 1963, 21f.)
This analysis has shown, we believe, that the relationships between 
the goals are rather complicated. All goals cannot be maximized simulta­
neously. Compromises are made necessary, especially between the goals 
of industrialization and public welfare. Both these goals affect that of 
political stability, which in turn is seen as a main responsibility and 
concern of the power-holding political groups. And in Mexican history po­
litical stability has never been something to be taken for granted. In
Mexico, therefore, the political elements will have to take the major share 
of the responsibility for how compromises between economic growth and public 
welfare are achieved. The state, represented by the federal government and 
the top organs of the ruling party, exercises a great deal of influence 
over business, as well as over labor unions and agrarian organizations, 
to this end. (The business community has considerable political influence, 
but how this is exerted, falls outside of the scope of this paper.)
Well organized interest groups exist in Mexico which attempt to promote 
one or the other of the goals in i . Interest groups differ from one another 
in the priority ordering they want to see given to the goals in f~ . The 
agrarian organizations demand a rapid completion of the land reform at 
the expense of those landholders who still own or control more land than the 
Cadigo Agrarro allows. The middle class, including many governmental official 
seems to regard land reform measures¿ and especially economic aid to marginal 
farmers, as welfare measures that should be given low priority in order that 
capital not be diverted from more profitable enterprises. The labor orga­
nizations demand wage increaees־ and other benefits for the urban working 
classes. Business groups demand freedom from government regulations. (For 
description of several of these organizations, see Scott, 1964j Brandenburg, 
1964J and Kling, 1961.)
2.1. The national political leadership in Mexico is strongly committed 
to the goal-structure and is cognizant of the interrelations 
between the various goals.
Mexican presidential administrations have differed with respect to the 
emphasis given to the different goals, but we think it is fair to say that
every regime from around 1920 and on has pursued the goals in , and been 
fairly well aware of their interrelations. In fact, certain changes over time 
in the political climate in Mexico can be interpreted as reflections of changes 
in priorities given to the elements in f~ . The Cárdenas administration 
(1934-40) was very much concerned with agrarian reform (to a large extent 
a welfare issue) and mexicanization. (The oil industry was nationalized in 
1938.) This regime, governing during the world-wide depression, could hardly 
have stressed economic growth and industrialization. In contrast, the Alemán 
regime (1946-52) stressed industrialization. The heavy emphasis on industri­
alization necessitated, or was seen to necessitate, holding back wage increases 
and other welfare measures. This took the form of repressive measures against 
militant labor union and agrarian agitation, and accounts for the bad name 
of Miguel Alemán in left-wing circles in Mexico.
III. The Oligarchic Pattern.
The Mexican national leadership seems, by choice or necessity, to be 
committed to tolerating a substantial amount of political pluralism. It 
is taken for granted, and indeed sometimes encouraged, that occupational groups 
attempt to promote their interests and demands through organizations. Poli­
tical parties, other than the ruling PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) 
are also tolerated, although not allowed to challenge the PRI monopoly on 
power.
3.1. The political leadership in Mexico is committed to a substantial 
amount of pluralism, but is determined to preserve for the fore­
seeable future the de facto power monopoly of the PRI.
Our next two principles deal with conflict between interest groups.
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3.2. The top decision-makers in Mexican national politics act 
so as to minimize the overt conflicts between ititenreot 
groups giving different priorities to the elements in f* .
3.3. If conflict arises between interest groups involving 
priority ordering of goals in I , the top leadership of the 
PRI and the government reserves for itself the right to make 
final and binding decisions.
Several writers about Mexican politics have emphasized that interest 
groups play an important role in the political system. The ruling party, 
the PRI, consists of three segments: the agrarian (peasant and agricul­
tural laborers) sector (CNC, Confederación Nacional Campesina) the labor 
sector (CTM, Confederación de ׳: > Trahadores Mexicanos), and the middle class 
sector (CNOP, Confederación Nacional de Organisaciónes Populares). The 
only major interest groups that are excluded from the party are certain 
business groups. (For further organizational details, see Scott, 1964.)
In the party policy-making and executive bodies on the local, state and 
national level, there will always be representatives from each one of the 
three sectors. The various interest groups therefore have a voice in the 
nominations for public offices like federal and state deputies, senators, 
state governors and president of the republic. (He who gets the PRI no­
mination, then,can be virtually sure of getting elected.) There is no 
doubt that in the pre-nomination struggle the various interest groups try 
to promote candidates sympathetic to their causes. It seems to be clear, 
however, that the top leadership of the party maintains rather tight con­
trol over who gets the actual nominations. Nominations are made at party 
conventions, but before the name of an aspirant is put before the convention, 
he will have to be approved by the national committee (Comite׳ Ejecutivo
Nacional), the top group of the PRI. Thus, the national committee has
effective veto power.
We interviewed a representative of the National Committee of 
the PRI, who had been sent to a northern state to supervise the 
selection of candidates for the 1964 elections. He told us that 
there had been six aspirants for the two Senate posts from the 
State. The national committee allowed only two names to be placed 
before the convention which then had the option of accepting or 
rejecting these two men. During the discussion he maintained that 
this procedure should not be called imposition of candidates by the 
national committee; the committee passes on candidates that have 
been made available on the local scene. He also emphasized that 
Mexico, because of its turbulent history, needs a party that main­
tains ',La pa?, social" by seeing to it that equilibrium is maintained 
between the various special interest groups. He also said that, in 
his opinion, the middle class sector of the party, the CNOP, can be 
said to represent the 'national interest' more than the more specialized 
agrarian and labor sectors. The CNOP represents a 'more varied col­
lection of interests' than the other sectors, according to him.
We interviewed the representative from the national committee 
in the presence of high PRI officials on the state level (including 
the president of the state committee). Everybody was very deferential 
toward the national committee man. The latter did not hesitate to 
interrupt the others and was addressed by the honorific title ,Don.' 
(Anderson and Cockroft, Field Notes. Summer 1964).
The national committee consists of 7 members and is one of the most 
powerful political bodies in Mexico, second only to the office of the 
president of the republic or the secretary of the Interior (Gcfoernaci6n).
While we agree with Robert Scott and others that interest groups are 
very important in Mexican politics, we believe that they play an essentially 
secondary role, and that the real power lies in an inner circle of the 
ruling party. (It is hard to say how large this group is or how it is 
structured.) The interest groups articulate demands and needs, but the
decisions how to combine and harmonize these demands on the national level
in the light of long-tern goals are made by the ruling circle. The leaders 
are, however, at the same time, very much concerned with getting to know 
the points of view of various interest groups. The decisions of the top 
leadership are carried out by a bureaucracy, staffed by professionals of 
various kinds. They often seem to have a '1middle class" orientation, but 
they hardly act in their professional roles as representatives of any 
interest groups. The "technicos," strongly committed to dirigisme, seem 
concerned with efficiency and . economic modernization, often viewed in a 
long term perspective. That the bureajcrnts and politicians consult with 
representatives of the interest groups is obvious, but consultation is not 
necessarily acquiesing to pressures and demands, but can be purely for 
purposes of information and cooptation (see section 4). Leaders of interest 
groups on the local and national level are very busy trying to influence 
administrative decisions and seek redress for grievances and local problems, 
like shortage of water for irrigation, maltreatment of peasants by local 
officials and so on (compare La Palombara, 1950). Thus, several of the 
peasant leaders we interviewed make regular trips to Mexico City on behalf 
of the members of their organizations. This holds both for leaders of the 
official CNC and those representing dissident groups. It is obvious that 
some detailed empirical studies of political and bureaucratic practice 
need to be done before we can say anything beyond these generalities about 
the role of the interest groups in the formulation of long-term policies 
on the one hand and administrative implementation on the other.
There have been some very recent developments that suggest that the 
oligarchic control over nominationsmay change. The regime has lately been
experimenting (in Baja California) with a nomination procedure based on
direct primaries. In these "elecciones internas" the members of the PRI,
by direct and secret ballot (see for instance E¿ Dia, April 14, 1965, and
Política. April 15, 1965, 24), selected candidates for various offices.
These elections were reported to have proceeded quietly. The leader of
the PAN in Baja California declared that the chosen PRI candidate for
governor is "an honorable man" and he expected that the coming constitu-
2tional elections will "be clean" (El Dia, April 14, 1965.) This experi­
ment with direct internal election was explicitly set up in order to select 
candidates with popular support. It was conceded that the old system, 
still practised in the other states, often led to the selection of candi­
dates with little support among the population. (See for instance 
Excelsior, April 7, 1965.)
IV. The Cooptation Pattern.
The ruling party in Mexico was built up during the 1920s and 1930s 
to provide a political instrument for the modernization and nationalization 
of the polity. It was from the very beginning ideologically and socially 
very heterogeneous. Apart from an adherence to the principles of the 
revolution, as set forth in the constitution and various other documents, 
membership required no specific ideological commitments. Marxists and 
other socialists became members, as did traditional liberals and people 
without any coherent political beliefs at all. The party has by and large 
continued to be pragmatic and ideologically vague. At times strongly 
ideologically oriented groups have split away from the PRI. In the late
9A PAN leader in Baja California later bitterly alleged that the elections 
held irt the' State in August 1965 were fraudulent.
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1940s, for instance, the former leader of the labor sector, Vincente 
Lombardo Toledano, split away to form his own Partido Popular Socia­
lista, (PPS), which claims to be Marxist. (We shall have more to say 
about this party and its peasant organization later, in section V.l.)
In the last 5 years or so, there has been a great deal of unrest in the 
peasant sector of the ruling party. An independent peasant organization, 
(CCI, that is Central Campesina Independiente) was formed by people who 
used to be active in CNC, the PRI peasant sector. This group is espe­
cially strong in Baja California and is led by a rather charismatic leader 
named Alfonzo Garzón. (We discuss this movement in section V.2.) Both 
the PPS and the CCI are very critical of the PRI and "the ruling oligarchy•” 
The two organizations have organized mass demonstrations in favor of radical 
agrarian policies in their strongholds (the PPS and its peasant organiza­
tion in the Yaqui and Mayo valleys in Sonora, and the CCI in Mexicali,
Baja California) . Several of their leaders have been jailed and the 
authorities have used rather harsh methods to ‘1restore order." (Hispanic 
American Report, November, 1962.) However, and here we have to anticipate 
sections v.l and V.2, in spite of their bitter criticism of the PRI, both 
the PPS and the CCI Rive the PRI a kind of qualified support, especially 
at election times. The dissidents do not attempt to build political parties 
that could aspire to become serious rivals of the PRI. (It is true that 
elements of the CCI supported the uncompromising Frente Electoral del Pueblo 
in the 1964 elections, but this was an exception to the main trend and later 
caused the CCI to split.) The PPS openly supported the PRI presi­
dential candidate, Gustavo Diaz Ordáz,in this election, and Alfonzo Garzón
seems lately also to have found that he has something in common with the 
PRI. In a report of a meeting between Garzón and the new president of the 
PRI (head of the Comité Nacional) agreement was said to have been reached 
about certain issues (... con respecto a los destinos de Baja California; 
Siempre, March 31, 1965, 57.) The PPS and CCI are not the only dissident 
groups that have kept or built ties with the PRI. In the 1960s left-wing 
groups inside and outside the PRI formed an organization called Movimiento 
de Liberación Nacional, (MLN). This group was very critical of the PRI, 
but its majority did not break with the party in 1964. Its chief sponsor, 
ex-president Lázaro Cárdenas, endorsed Diaz Ordáz, the PRI candidate. We 
were told by a man who had been a local leader of the MLN in a northern 
state, that the best thing for him and people like him would be to support 
the PRI and work inside the party for a more radical line. In return,he 
and others seemed to expect that the left would get some influence; that 
maybe some cabinet post would be given to a person sympathetic to their 
point of view. (Anderson and Cockroft, Field Notes. Summer, 1964.)
A change in the electoral system, put into effect for the first time 
in 1964, guarantees that some officially 1’approved" opposition groups get 
representation in the federal Chamber of Deputies. Twenty-five seats 
are divided between the legally registered opposition parties in proportion 
to their total showing in the elections. Since the total number of deputies 
is 200, the PRI retains a comfortable majority.
We believe that the leadership of the PRI rather systematically attempts 
to make dissidents ־:•■ give at least qualified and partial support to the 
party, and that the PRI is willing to give dissidents a hearing and certain 
concessions in return for such limited support.
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the 1920s had as one of its tasks to overcome this fragmentation, to build 
an organization which, although ideally sensitive to local needs and demands, 
could be an instrument in the construction of a modern, rather centralized 
state and the maintenance of social peace. As we have already said, the party 
chose to be ideologically pragmatic and vague, in order to accomodate the 
various different groups. Groups of different persuasions were offered 
rewards and concessions in return for loyalty to the party and the regime.
It was also, however, made very clear that the party would not tolerate any 
strong centers of power that were outside of the party or not allied with 
the party. If cotiptation failed strongarm methods were used. Many of the local 
caudillos and caciques were assasinated, on order from the regime. Gradually 
there emerged the pattern we have seen: the PRI attempts to coüpt dissident 
groups and these know that in order to have any impact at all it is wise for the: 
to maintain friendly relations with the PRI. Repression of uncoüptable groups 
is nowadays most of the time less harsh, but it still exists. While the PRI 
and its presidential candidate won support from many of the leftists, bitterly 
critical of the "oligarchy^׳ in the 1964 elections, some leftist groups formed 
the Frente Electoral del Pueblo, (FEP). This organization was hostile to 
the PRI and had its own candidate for the presidency. The FEP was not allowed 
to register as a legal political party. It was also regarded as ineffectual 
and unrealistic by many people sympathetic to its views on issues. (A strong 
split developed, for instance, within another dissident group, the MLN, over 
whether or not to support the FEP.) Thirty members of the FEP, the CCI and the 
Mexican Communist party were arrested in April 1965 in Mexico City and many
s
documents were confiscated (Politics, April 15, 1965, 5).
We thus have another principle of politics in Mexico.
4.2. If coüptation of dissident groups fails, then repression 
is likely to occur.
The measures taken against the FEP and the Communists presumably 
represent premeditated decisions by the national authorities. There is also 
another type of repression in Mexico which represents survivals of earlier 
political forms. Local political and military authorities sometimes resort 
to violence against dissident groups, especially, it seems, in the country■־ 
side .־׳
In Baja California, for example, an agrarian settlement, not 
far from Ensenada, is ruled by a cacique, who seems to base his power 
on his connections with the CNC and the state government. Opponents 
to him within the settlement have been assasinated by his alleged 
'pistoleros
As we have already said, politics in the state of Guerrero has 
the reputation of being controlled by traditional bosses. In the late 
1950s there occurred violent and bloody clashes between soldiers and 
demonstrators in the cities of Iguala and Chilpancingo. The governor 
responsible for these measures of violence was later removed by the pre­
sident of the republic. (Anderson and Cockroft, Field Notes, 1964.)
The PRI has been more concerned with coüpting left-wing than right- 
wing dissidence. The reason for this is partly that the PRI regards itself 
as the only legitimate heir to the Mexican revolution. This revolution 
was made in order to accmplish large-scale social change. The conservative 
and clerical groups that were bitterly opposed to the revolution had no 
place in the revolutionary party. They had to be reckoned with but could 
not be cotipted. Left-wing dissidents, however, could challenge the PRI on
^For accounts of politically inspired violence in different parts of 
Mexico/ see the weekly Política, the section entitled "La Nación."
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its own ground. The regime has tolerated a conservative opposition party,
the Partido de Acción Nacional,(PAN. The PAN voters come from different
social strata. There are the big businessmen, the members of the small town
clerically oriented middle classes and also the religious peasants in some
parts of the country. (See for instance Foster 1943 for a description of
peasant conservatism). The party also attracts workers and peasants who
are discontented with the ruling PRI, which is often seen as corrupt
and inefficient. The PAN won some local election, for instance in Mérida,
Yucatán in 1964, but has never been able to challenge the power of the PRI
in any serious manner. It used to accuse the PRI of large scale fraud
in the counting of ballots. Recently the PAN has accepted the legitimacy of
Christian Democratic 
the basic gains of the revolution and a/faction of the party is making
itself noticed. In talking with PRI officials one sometimes gets the
impression that the PAN is regarded as a legitimate opposition party which
fulfills an important role in Mexican politics (the revolution was among
other things made in the name of democracy), but which is not expected to
seriously challenge the role of the PRI, sometimes referred to as "el Par-
4
tido officiál", as representative of the mainstream of Mexican politics.
/
^We said earlier that in Mexico a rather modern political system on 
the national level coexists with remnant of a traditional system. This is 
well illustrated by the contrast between the Baja California direct primaries 
with the following incident observed by an anthropolotist in the state of 
Oaxaca: On election day in 1964 in a Zapotee community nobody cast a vote.
In spite of the some 500 votes were recorded for both the PRI and the PPS.
The count was made by the tow officials from the lists of residents. Nobody 
in the twon seemed to mind. (W.H. Geoghegan, Field Notes, Summer, 1964.)
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Vincente Lombardo Toledano was head of the labor sector of the PRI 
up until 1941. In the late forties, after having been pushed aside by the 
ruling Alemán group in the PRI, he founded the Marxist Partido Popular 
Socialista. In collaboration with Lombardo a peasant leader, Jacinto Lopez, 
who had earlier been active in the CNC, founded the agrarian organization,
Union General de Obreros y Campesinos Mexicanos. This organization has branches 
in more than a dozen states, but has its main strength in Sonora, primarily 
in the Yaqui and Mayo river valleys. The organization comprises both 
members of agricultural collectives (ejidos; for the meaning of the word 
"collective" here see¿for instance,Whetten, 1948) and landless laborers who 
demand land (solicitantes de tierra).
In the Yaqui valley the Union General, claims to have some 11,000 
members (700 ejidatarios and some 10,000 solicitantes), organized in 117 
local groups. The organization has a democratic structure: decisions are 
made by an assembly of the chairmen of the locals. A secretary coordinates 
the activities from a small office in Ciudad Obregón, the main city of the 
region.
The main activity of the organization consists of putting pressure on 
the political authorities on the municipal state and national levels to obtain 
full compliance with the agrarian reform laws. The valley has good, irri­
gated land, suitable for cotton, wheat and some corn. There are many ejidos 
in the Yaqui valley, but much land is also in the hands of private families. 
Maps of the land tenure situation show that members of some families of 
revolutionary fame and families related to these by marriage (Obregón, Tapia״ 
Calles) own large, sometimes continuous holdings. In order to comply with
the letter of the law, the land a kin group owns is divided up between quite 
a few members. This is regarded by the peasant organization as a violation 
of the spirit of the land reform laws.
The Union General demands a change in this situation. A substantial pert 
of the privately owned land should, the organization claims, be made into 
ejido l?nd, so that at least some of the many landless solicitantes can get 
titles to land of their own. The organization has sponsored mass demonstra­
tions and land invasions in order to put pressure on the authorities.
In spite of its agrarian militancy, the Union General maintains somewhat 
strained, but not unfriendly relations with the PRI. Our informant characte­
rized the relations between the organization and the state government at 
that time (1964) as "cordial." It had been worse earlier when the son of 
Alvaro Obregin, the revolutionary leader and later president of the Republic, 
(a member of one of the great landholding families) was governor of Sonora. 
When Diaz Ordiz was nominated as the PRI presidential candidate, the Union 
General followed the decision of Lombardo Toledano to support him. Diaz 
Ordkz met with Jacinto Lopez and the Yaqui valley leader of the Union General 
in Hermosillo, the capital of Sonora. At that time the peasant leaders 
turned over to him a detailed account of the land tenure situation in the 
Yaqui and Mayo valleys. (This meeting was given some national publicity, 
see Siempre, May 6, 1964.) Diaz Ord&z was very concerned with the situation 
(our notes from interviews with Jacinto Lopez and Yaqui valley informant). He 
used language to the effect that the situation is a scandal (es un desmadre) 
and indicated that he would try to do something about the situation. The 
Union General leaders were evidently rather impressed with Diaz OrdAz, who
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used to be regarded as a member of the right-wing of the PRI. "He 
matured during his campaign, came to understand domestic and agrarian 
problems" they said. (Our field Notes, 1954.)
Lombardo Toledano seems, in spite of his Marxist ideology and leader­
ship of an opposition party to retain some access to and influence in the 
inner circle of the government. The PPS got a number of the minority 
party seats in the national Chamber of Deputies after the 1964 elections, 
and Jacinto Lopez was seated as a representative of the party. Lopez clearly 
seemed to regard this as a gain. He and his organization now have a 
national platform from which they can make their views heard. Lopez and 
our other informants from the Union General are clearly gradualists. They 
believe that change can only come slowly in Mexico as a result of pressures 
and organization work„ . The organization was, nevertheless,
denounced as Communist by some PRI leaders from the middle class sector 
we interviewed in Hermosilla, Sonora.
V:2. The CCI Experience: Dissent Followed by Coaptation.
The CCI received its initial impetus from Alfonso Garz6n of Baja 
California, after a left-leaning state governor there (1953-59) had named 
the charismatic peasant leader head of the state branch of the CNC, the PRI's 
peasant sector. However, when the CNC and PRI failed to meet adequately the 
demands of Baja California peasants, already aroused by the dumping of 
saline water from the U.S. Colorado River which killed off their crops 
(HAR,־*XV, 989-90), Garzin broke from the PRI to form his own peasant move­
ment, the nucleus of the national CCI, which was officially founded about a 
year later (HAR, XVI, 14-16). He took an overwhelming majority of Baja
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California's peasants with him (our interviews).
As the salinity problem worsened, as new CCI locals formed in other 
states, and finally as Communist-oriented members of the CCI (less so 
Garzón's group) openly backed the "illegal" presidential candidate of the 
FEP.In 1964, the PRI stepped up its pressures on Garzón and his followers 
to "re-enter the fold." Garzón had vainly essayed the tactic of political 
candidacy against the PRI in 1962, when he ran for mayor of Mexicali but was 
refused recognition as a candidate. The failure of FEP candidate Ramón 
Danzos Palomino, himself a peasant leader from the north (the impoverished 
La Laguna area), in the 1964 presidential elections, may have further disillu­
sioned Garzón with the efficacy of political dissent. In any case, repression 
of CCI demonstrations continued apace, and by 1964 Garzón seemed willing to 
reconsider his relationship with the PRI.
The CCI people we interviewed emphasized that their organization was 
working solely for the interests of the campesinos. They seerfid determined 
not to let their organization be used for any broader political purposes, and 
expressed rather strong resentment against the Communist Party, which they 
accused of being more interested in broad political questions than in the 
problems of the peasants. Within the CCI friction between the Cbmmunists 
and their sympathizers and Garzón and his group has occurred from the time 
the organization was founded.
The CCI, then, is clearly a dissenting group, but it is important to note 
that its dissent, although very vigorous, has been limited to a sharply limited 
set of issues. This strategy, of course, makes a reconciliation with the 
official party, once the issues that brought about dissent have been attended
to, much easier than a line of more diffuse and less delineated dissent.
In the interviews, the CCI men often condemned certain groups within the 
PRI, but indicated that there were others that they respected. For example, 
speaking about a peasant leader in Mexicali who had chosen to stay in the 
official CNC where he led a dissident faction, they emphasized that he is 
"clean and honorable." The PRI on its part kept lines of communication open 
with the CCI, at least with its branch in Baja California, the Liga Agraria 
Estatal. Before the 1964 elections, one of the PRI candidates for senator 
from this state contacted leaders of the Liga, in order to hear their points 
of view on current issues.
The Diaz Ordáz administration concluded an agreement with the United 
States which promises to end the dumping of salt water into the Colorado 
River. It has also been announced that large sums of money will be used 
by the government to rehabilitate the Mexicali valley land that had been ruined 
by salt water. (El Dia, March 26, 1965.) At least some of the goals that 
the CCI had been agitating for have thus been achieved. In September 1964, 
Garzón declared Communist members of the CCI personae non grata (Política,
Oct. 15, 1964). Danzós, his followers from the Laguna, and all Communist 
members of the CCI in turn declared Garzón and his group expelled from the 
CCI. In effect, a second CCI was formed behind Danzós.
Garzón, meanwhile began to cooperate more openly with the PRI. Demon­
strations by Garzón's CCI became less common, although various of his
followers continued to be smeared as "Communists" and jailed from time to time. 
Garzón and his group seemed to have made their peace with the PRI at the 
time of gubernatorial election in Baja California in August 1965. Garzón was 
photographed frequently with the PRI candidate, and according to at least 
the PAN, Garzón openly campaigned for the PRI among the peasantry (El Dla,
July 30, 1965). Thus, Garzón and the CCI seemed to be following the same 
road toward coüptation by the PRI as Jacinto López and the Union General did 
in Sonora a year earlier.
The PRI still had to reckon with the uncoüptable Danzós faction of the 
CCI, however. As we would expect, repressive measures were used toward them. 
When small-scale milk producers in Puebla protested a new pasteurization 
law which threatened to encourage large monopolies in October, 1964, they 
invited Danzós to address a rally. Danzós and other "Communists" were jailed. 
The PRI labor movement, and the CTM rallied behind the state governor in a 
show of unity. This may have been a mistake, for among Puebla's students 
and workers the occasion of the milk-producers' protest and severe repression 
of demonstrators was a perfect pretext for expressing their own complaints 
about the relatively unprogressive and stagnant administration of the governor, 
an Army General accused of nepotism. When massive demonstrations demanding 
the governor's resignation mounted, and a few labor unions began to cancel 
their affiliation with the CTM, (some observers said that worker soviets 
were even formed in some cases), the problem assumed national proportions.
The President of Mexico called in high national and local PRI officials and 
worked out an immediate solution. The demands of the dissidents were 
swiftly met. The Puebla governor stepped down behind the facade of "a leave
of absence." The people who booed him turned out the next day to cheer the 
new governor, who was flown in from Quintana Roo where his progressive admini- 
stration had been described by PPS leader Lombardo Toledano as "an example 
for all governors to follow." (Politica, Nov. 1, 1964, also, Exc£lsior &
El Dia, Oct. 15 through Nov. 1, 1964.)
The Puebla experience was one of dissent, followed by repression, 
followed by a kind of cotJptation. When repression failed, cotfpting the 
demands of the dissenters by naming a new governor with a more liberal 
program succeeded.
VI. Mcxican Political Patterns as Functions of the Goal-structure♦
The two broad tendencies in Mexican politics that we have tried to 
demonstrate in the previous three sections, the (Oligarchical and the cotiptation 
patterns, should be related to the nature of the goal-structure that we 
described in section II. In an underdeveloped society with sharp latent 
and often manifest conflicts between interest groups, regions and to some 
extent ethnic groups and a tradition of political violence, a regime that is 
strongly committed to political stability, substantial economic development 
and social welfare, faces a task that must often seem insurmountable. If 
the regime, by choice or necessity, is also committed to a certain amount of 
political pluralism, then it cannot choose the way of Communist one-party 
states. Under conditions of economic backwardness increments in welfare 
pdicies and wages and other benefits must be controlled carefully, if there 
are to be resources available for economic growth. The demands and expectations 
of the population have to be met to some extent to ensure the necessary amount
of political stability: required for continuous economic growth. Dissident 
political groups, based on substantial or important social strata that believe 
that their demands have not been met adequately, will tend to develop. If 
the regime is unable to or does not want to suppress these, then it has to 
develop ways of co-existing with them, but in such a way that they do not 
threaten the stability of the polity. The regime will very likely tend to 
develop mechanisms like the control and cotiptation pattern described in our 
analysis.
If our analysis is right, the Mexican polity provides an example of a 
complicated system of exchanges between interest groups and an oligarchy 
that provides decisive and sometimes rather ruthless leadership. It is 
what Shills (1962) calls a tutelary democracy. Political "interest group" 
theory, which has had a tendency to view politics solely as shaped by con­
tending interest groups, and hence to ignore the role of leadership on the 
national level, should have much to learn from the study of this system.
In conclusion we shall mention, but not analyze here, one important 
cost that may be inherent in this type of political system. The absence of a 
real contest between opposing political parties breeds political apathy and 
indifference. We know that popular participation in Mexican politics is quite 
low compared to more advanced democracies (Almond and Verba, 1963, Chaps 3-9).
Vie are referring to real involvement in politics, not the kind of sham participa 
tion that occurs when a busload of peasants is brought in to cheer a 
candidate in return for beer and food. It is quite clear that the top 
leadership desir׳es active citizen participation in public affairs, but the 
basic• structural features of the polity may make it impossible to reach this go? 
The minority party seats in the Chamber of Deputies and the experiment with
direct primaries may be first steps toward making a fuller participation 
possible. If direct primaries in the future *re adopted in all the states of 
the Mexican union and areused for nominating candidates for all local offices, 
from mayor to state governor and federal deputy and senator, then it is likely 
that the two features of the Mexican polity this paper has dealt with will 
change rather drastically.
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